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Message to – and from – the European political leadership: 
Agreeing to disagree on strategy is a luxury the EU can no longer afford 
Jo Coe lmont 
“We, the political leaders of the EU 
member states, in order to ensure the 
security of our citizens and to resolve 
more effectively and more efficiently the 
common problems we face at present do 
agree on a global EU strategy that 
couples unity of vision with unity of 
action.” 
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“special status” for the UK provoked a debate 
on the desired “common status” for all 
member states, regardless of whether the UK 
will stay in or leave. The drama that indeed 
surrounded the meeting may very well explain 
why key positions taken by several political 
leaders on this strategic matter got lost in 
translation at the moment the European 
Council conclusions were rendered public.  
 
Similarly, at first glance the many European 
Council meetings that took place, soon after, 
on migration demonstrated but disagreement 
among the member states. Yet, after long 
discussions, it became clear that the latitude to 
further disagree on a common strategy is gone 
and that additional national policies are de 
facto on their way to getting more 
“Europeanised”. The recent terrorist attracts 
in Brussels underlined, if needed, the urgency 
of sticking together.  
 
However, before probing into the real 
significance of these recent European Council 
meetings, we must analyse how our European 
project has so far adjusted itself whenever a 
new geopolitical era emerged.    
  
A HISTORICAL REFLECTION 
During so called historical EU meetings the 
focus invariably was on issues of war and 
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Not that long ago, pretending that such a 
sentence could capture the emerging 
consensus between Europe’s political leaders 
would have been considered an illusion. But 
times are changing. We are entering into a new 
geopolitical era. The post-Cold War 
intermezzo is over. Quo vadis EU, now that it 
is at a crossroads? Are we heading towards 
disintegration, fragmentation, the EU 
shrinking away into some sort of European 
commonwealth? Or does the future still hold 
“ever closer union”? Analysing recent 
European Council meetings reveals which 
political orientation has a gain momentum.  
 
At first glance the European Council meeting 
on the EU-UK deal was only of importance to 
the UK. Many commentators saw only a 
fabricated drama created around some tactical 
issues and a search for some (predictable) 
technical solutions. However, the quest for a 
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peace and collective security, on sovereignty 
and the principle of subsidiarity. On la finalité 
politique also or, in other words, “ever closer 
union”, and on a way of working: la méthode 
Monnet.   
 
At the start, the founding fathers had in mind 
the hard lessons from both World Wars: a 
system of absolutely sovereign national states 
leads to absolute competition among them and 
is therefore absolutely the shortest avenue to 
crisis and even war. Henceforth they would 
focus on collective security and on restoring 
sovereignty at a level consistent with the 
magnitude of the common problems that need 
to be resolved. They agreed on strategy. They 
agreed on la finalité politique – and on two 
strategic building blocks: the principle of 
subsidiarity and la méthode Monnet.  
 
The geopolitical era at time was the one 
of the Cold War. This allowed the 
member states to outsource their 
collective defence to NATO, while their 
respective foreign policies towards third 
countries were barely touched upon by the 
European project. All member states were to 
develop, on a bilateral basis, a preferential 
relationship with the US, if not a special one.  
 
And it worked pretty well, until the crisis in 
Yugoslavia made clear that once again a new 
geopolitical era was looming and that the 
Union had to adapt accordingly.  
 
THE POST-COLD WAR INTERMEZZO 
At the Helsinki European Council of 
December 1999 it was decided to 
“strengthen”, in fact to launch, a European 
Security and Defence Policy. The taboo on all 
things military as part and parcel of European 
integration was lifted under the impulse of 
France and the UK. The common ambition 
was to restore sovereignty at the EU level by 
enabling the member states to launch a 
military crisis management operation of the 
magnitude that was needed in Yugoslavia. The 
principle of subsidiarity pointed not towards 
some bilateral or multilateral arrangements 
among some member states, but to the Union 
to develop CFSP and ESDP and to ensure the 
availability of the required resources and 
capabilities to underpin these policies.   
  
At the same European Council meeting it was 
decided to also launch a new stage in the 
enlargement process and to deepen of the 
Union. The Union as such would henceforth 
be more outward-looking, in particular in the 
areas of security and defence. A strategic shift 
was taking place by Europeanising some 
security and defence issues, in particular crisis 
management.   
The objectives were ambitious. But the EU 
instruments put in place soon proved to be far 
from effective and efficient. In 2003, deep 
political divisions rose among members states 
about the war in Iraq. It provoked a deeply 
shared political frustration. It allowed, in 
extremis, to add two additional working groups 
to the European Convention. The results are 
well known. And Javier Solana was to publish 
the first ever European Security Strategy (ESS). 
The taboo on writhing down the words 
security and strategy in a single EU document 
was finally lifted. 
 
Alas, the enthusiasm and dynamics one could 
witness during the Convention evaporated 
during the long and bumpy process to ratify 
the Lisbon Treaty. Many of its clauses on 
security and defence were never put into 
practice and the ESS remained just “a 
document” that never inspired any action at 
the EU level (nor any inaction, for that 
matter).  
Throughout the process  o f  en largement ,  the  “we 
agree  on s trategy” vo i ced by the f i r s t  generat ion 
o f  European pol i t i ca l  l eaders  turned s lowly  but 
sure ly  into “we agree  to  d isagree  on s trategy” 
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During the Post-Cold War era it was 
mainstream thinking that, in Europe, we had 
the privilege to live in a post-modern world. 
And that all other countries, continents and 
global actors would follow, sooner or later. In 
this context, for the EU and the member 
states, it was all about exporting security 
through enlargement and (economic) 
partnerships.  
 
During that very particular geopolitical era, in 
retrospective a short one, being a global actor 
was in fact the privilege of countries the size of 
a continent – or of a solid political 
construction representing a continent. At the 
additional condition, that is, of possessing a 
security strategy and the required capabilities to 
act accordingly. Within the EU we seemed 
convinced that, given the circumstances, 
fulfilling but one of these three preconditions 
would be sufficient to be considered as global 
actor as well.   
 
 
As to enlargement, the EU objectives were 
reached swiftly. As to the deepening of the 
Union, is was a fiasco. In particular in the area 
of security and defence. On generating the 
required military capabilities the hailed bottom 
up approach led but to some bilateral or 
multilateral arrangements to pool and share 
those tactical military capabilities that the 
members states had in abundance anyway. 
Apparently the main objective was to save 
some money. EU- wide cooperation aimed at 
addressing the commonly identified shortfalls 
qua strategic capabilities was not on the radar 
screen. The net result of this bottom up 
approach, without any top down steering, was 
a steep dropdown of tactical military capacities 
while the strategic shortfalls, identified back in 
2000, remained all intact.  
 
In the mean time CSDP evolved towards 
modest Crisis management Sine Defence Policy. 
And CFSP apparently turned into a policy 
whereby it is Common to Forget Supporting 
Defence. Was this just a temporary strategic 
distraction at a time when Europe was never “so 
prosperous, so secure nor so free”, as the ESS 
stated?  
 
However, it cannot be denied that throughout 
the process of enlargement, the “we agree on 
strategy” voiced by the first generation of 
European political leaders turned slowly but 
surely into “we agree to disagree on strategy”. 
 
THINKING STRATEGICALLY 
At present we are entering once more into a 
new strategic era. Geopolitics are on the move. 
Balance of power is back. And the borders 
between external and internal security are 
evaporating. A new strategic era, yet 
without a name.  
The balance of power implies that now, 
more than ever, it is essential—and for 
Europeans, even vital—to be able to 
forge solid and durable partnerships with 
other global actors. Today, the main 
threat to the EU and the member states is 
to lose Europe’s partners, in particular the US, 
and to lose NATO, because of Europe’s 
persistent reluctance to develop a credible 
security policy and forge coherent and effective 
defence forces.  
Given the nexus between external and internal 
security and the magnitude of the common 
problems member states are facing—such as 
migration, terrorism, and cyber threats, to 
name just a few—the challenge is to explain 
why, based on the principle of subsidiarity, 
security policy is the next area in line to be 
Europeanized. This policy, as a sub strategy 
will have to be part and parcel of 
Today,  the main threat  to  the EU and the 
member s tates  i s  to  lose  Europe ’s  partners ,  in 
part i cu lar the US, and to  lose  NATO, because 
o f  Europe ’s  pers i s t ent  re luc tance  to  deve lop a 
cred ib le  se cur i ty  po l i cy  and forge  coherent  and 
e f f e c t ive  de f ence  for ces .  
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“comprehensive” overall EU strategy – in 
concrete terms of the EU Global Strategy that 
is in the making. It is to ensure that unity of 
vision is coupled with unity of action. 
Are we, within the Union, at the brink of 
taking that avenue?  
WHAT FUNDAMENTAL MESSAGE 
STEMMING FROM THE EUROPEAN 
COUNCIL ON THE EU-UK DEAL?  
During the prolonged meetings on the EU-UK 
deal the fundamental concepts of sovereignty, 
subsidiary and even of “ever closer union” all 
entered into the discussion. Clarifications have 
been given on how to read and how not to 
read them. In straightforward language the 
résumé reads as follows.  
 
First, it has been pointed out that the EU-UK 
deal is more about an interpretation of the 
existing treaties than it is about treaty-change. 
This includes the political interpretation of 
“ever closer union”, which never entailed any 
legal obligation for member states. At 
the condition the UK is to stay in the 
Union, this will be stipulated a bit more 
explicitly in a next treaty-change.  
 
Secondly, it is getting clearly stated that 
if in future a smaller group of member 
states decides to go further down the pad of 
integrating their policies within the Union, they 
will be allowed to do so. Member states who 
prefer to abstain from such initiatives will have 
the option to join later, or never, but: with no 
rights to block, let alone to veto such 
endeavours.  
 
Thirdly, should the result of the UK’s 
referendum be for it to leave the EU, all 
special arrangements made to respond to the 
requests of the UK will cease to exist. This is a 
rather unique political signal that will resonate 
long after.   
 
Fourthly, this deal has clearly not set any 
credible precedent for other member state to 
force the Union to set up any special deal at 
their convenience. The drama around a 
potential Brexit had way too many elements 
and actors that were unique.  
 
TALKING REAL 
More important is to evaluate the longer term 
impact of this European Council meeting. Yes, 
there was an agreement among all to offer 
Prime Minister Cameron political capital for 
his campaign to avoid a Brexit. But there was 
also a strong political will to preserve the acquis 
of the Union, whatever the outcome of UK’s 
in/out referendum. For several member states 
the “drama” surrounding the UK deal 
provoked a catharsis, an opportunity to get rid 
of ways of working within the Union that had 
proven to have reached their limits. A quest on 
how to resolve more efficiently the ever 
growing common problems was put on the 
table. Even existential questions on how to 
ensure that national governments could remain 
relevant at home and abroad were voiced.   
Reading between the lines of the Council 
conclusions we learn that à la méthode Monnet 
the EU is about to circumvent yet other 
stumbling block without losing track of its 
fundament course. Room has been created for 
a kind of “structured flexibly” within the 
Union. There clearly is a political will emerging 
among to install a system of structured and 
permanent co-operation among those member 
states willing to further integrate some specific 
policies. Various clusters may arise. A central 
core group will probably emerge. But a union 
that is entirely à la carte is clearly not on the 
table. A clear and loud political signal has been 
voiced by a majority of member states: 
henceforth overall political and financial 
solidarity across all EU policies is required. No 
burden-sharing, no benefits.   
The nexus between external  and internal  se cur i ty  
i s  to  explain why secur i ty  po l i cy  i s  the  next area 
in l ine  to  be Europeanized.  
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At this memorable European Council meeting 
the crises in Syria and Libya where on the 
agenda as well. The outcome of the discussions 
was disappointing. The lack of any common 
strategy once more was all too obvious. Not 
that different from 2010, at the outbreak of the 
Arab Spring. However, at present the direct 
impact of these crises on the security of our 
European citizens at home is now of quite a 
different magnitude.  
Migration was on the agenda as well. It cannot 
be denied that during the discussions some 
strong centrifugal forces came to the fore. 
There was indeed a fundamental discussion 
between protagonists in favour of a repli sur soi, 
back to national “sovereign” decision-making, 
and strong believers of the opposite: repli 
additionnel sur l’Union. The outcome: steps were 
taken to safeguard Schengen and even to give 
room to the Commission to develop new 
initiatives, directly related to migration issues. 
This made it possible for the Commission to 
announce, one week later, that henceforth the 
EU funds for humanitarian assistance can also 
be provided to assist member states of the 
Union, with Greece to be the first beneficiary. 
Clearly another taboo in the EU construction 
had evaporated. Furthermore the project to 
create a “European Border and Coast Guard” 
was stimulated. Yet another national policy that 
is about to become Europeanised.  
 
The meetings on migrations held during the 
following weeks, at the level of ministers or 
heads of state and government, all went further 
down that path.  
 
BACK TO BASICS: THE UNION AS A 
SECURITY PROVIDER TO ITS CITIZENS 
The discussions on Syria and Libya also 
brought back to memory the origins of the 
Union. One could argue that the military is not 
part of EU’s DNA. At the time it was indeed 
about “no more war among European 
countries”. Fortunately, today our internal 
differences are settled at the negotiation table. 
But our European peninsula is part of a global 
world and unable to escape from taking up its 
responsibility. There are indeed no military 
solutions to war or other violent conflicts. 
However under certain circumstances the 
military is called to act as the indispensable catalyst 
to ensure that the political objectives of 
the Union can ultimately be met. At 
times the political and diplomatic 
chemistry will not work without a 
catalyst, able to operate preventively as 
well as during and after a crisis. And this 
indeed brings us back to the origins of our 
European endeavour. What kind of a security 
strategy is needed now that we are entering a 
new geopolitical era?  
 
THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY: A 
COINCIDENCE OR JUST IN TIME?   
The European Global Strategy on Foreign and 
Security Policy (EUGS) that High 
Representative Federica Mogherini will present 
shortly couldn’t be more timely.  This EU 
global strategy is in the first place about forging 
“unity of purpose”, to be coupled with “unity 
of action” throughout the whole range of EU 
policies dealing with external and internal 
security. The focus will be on identifying the 
required resources, capabilities, institutional 
coherence, and ways of working. Defence and 
in particular military capabilities will be 
prominently dealt with. It is also to present an 
attractive narrative to European citizens. Will 
the EUGS guide the Union as a 
“comprehensive” security provider, or will it 
turn into just another EU document: that is the 
question.  
 
IN THE END 
For this author, there is no doubt. The EU is 
heading towards a security union. His 
conviction is not based on the blind optimism 
of a livelong believer in ever closer union. He 
The “drama” surrounding the UK deal  provoked 
a cathars i s .  Room has been created for  a kind o f  
“struc tured f l exib ly” within the Union.  
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has grown steadily more fatalistic about the 
future of the Union, having observed how and 
when the principle of subsidiary is invariably 
applied within the European construction.  
National policies are indeed only then 
Europeanised when the reluctance to do so has 
already created damage of a magnitude no one 
can hide any longer, nor in political circles nor 
from public option, and when the political 
leadership at all levels gets desperate after having 
tried all other options. This explains why each 
and every policy that eventually got 
Europeanised went through a very slow process 
of transfer, bit by bit, so far however always just 
in time to prevent total disaster.  
 
Is it a given that this principle will always 
preserve the Union just in time? No. But as 
demonstrated, on internal and external security, 
there are presently clear signs out there that were 
not there before, at least not as explicit. We can 
see more and more European heads of state and 
government who are no longer pointing to the 
EU as a scapegoat to hide their inability to 
provide national solutions, and who openly 
rebuff, more than ever, cheap populism. 
Apparently time has come to talk real. 
Ambiguity is becoming lethal to internal 
cohesion within member states as it feeds 
populism. The message that is now gaining 
traction is that within the EU “agreeing to 
disagree on strategy no longer is an 
affordable luxury”.  
  
The only mystery the auteur cannot explain is 
why, at this particular moment, so many 
commentators get carried away by doom-
saying about the EU’ s future. There always 
was heat in the EU’s internal kitchen. But in 
the end, it always comes down to restoring 
sovereignty at a level consistent with the 
magnitude of the common problems that need 
to be resolved. Time has come, now the fog of 
drama has gone, to again present the EU as a 
unique attractive narrative. Partisans of 
abolishing the EU are indeed, as in the past, 
doomed to oblivion. Time has come to spread 
this message. 
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former Belg ian Permanent Mil i tary 
Representat ive  to the EUMC, is  a Senior 
Assoc iate  Fel low of  Egmont and Senior 
Fel low at the Royal  High Inst i tute  for  
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Time has come to  again present  the EU as a 
unique at trac t ive  narrat ive .   
